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Tackling climate change is at the top of many agendas. In this context, emission trading schemes
are considered as promising tools. The regulatory framework for an emission trading scheme in-
troduces a market for emission allowances and creates a need for risk management by appropriate
financial contracts. In this work, we address logical principles underlying their valuation.
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1. Introduction
The generic principle of an emission trading scheme is based on the so-called ‘cap-and-
trade’ mechanism. In this framework, an authority allocates fully tradable credits among
responsible institutions. At pre-settled compliance dates, each source must have enough
allowances to cover all of its recorded emissions, or be subject to penalties.
A mandatory cap-and-trade system involves its participants in a risky business with
an obvious need for risk management. That is, certificate trading is usually accompanied
by a secondary market for emission-related futures, including a rapidly growing variety
of their derivatives. Their pricing is addressed in this work.
Our contribution focuses on a methodology between equilibrium and risk-neutral ap-
proaches. Due to the complexity of emissions markets, risk-neutral dynamics must be
addressed in terms of explanatory variables, viewed as proxies of fundamental quanti-
ties. Thus, we utilize equilibrium analysis to explain the role of fundamentals in risk-
neutral allowance price formation. Thereby, the key issue is a feedback relation between
allowance prices and abatement activity. Namely, we demonstrate that any increase in
allowance price causes market participants to enforce emission saving in order to sell
their allowances. Hence, an increasing allowance price encourages a supply of certificates
and lowers the probability of non-compliance, which tends to bring down their prices.
Apparently, the correct description of this feedback is the key to derivatives pricing. The
present work focuses on this issue. On this account, our contribution goes beyond any
risk-neutral approach to modeling of emission-related assets suggested in the existing
literature to date.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article published by the ISI/BS in Bernoulli,
2010, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1240–1261. This reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
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2. Emissions markets
The literature on this subject is enormous: it encompass hundreds of books and papers.
For this reason, we focus only on those market models which are relevant in the present
approach.
Economic theory of allowance trading can be traced back to [8] and [14], whose au-
thors proposed a market model for the public environmental goods described by tradable
permits.
Dynamic allowance trading is addressed in [7, 11, 13, 16, 17, 21, 22] and in the literature
cited therein.
Empirical evidence from existing markets is discussed in [9]. This paper suggests eco-
nomic implications and hints at several ways to model spot and futures allowance prices,
whose detailed interrelations are investigated in [23] and [24].
Econometric modeling is addressed in [1], where characteristic properties for financial
time series are observed for prices of emission allowances from the mandatory European
Scheme EU ETS. Furthermore, a Markov switch and AR–GARCH models are suggested.
The work [15] also considers tail behavior and the heteroscedastic dynamics in the returns
of emission allowance prices.
Dynamic price equilibrium and optimal market design are investigated in [2]. Based on
this approach, [3] discusses the price formation for goods whose production is affected
by emission regulations. In this setting, an equilibrium analysis confirms the existence
of the so-called ‘windfall profits’ (see [19]) and provides quantitative tools to analyze
alternative market designs.
Pricing of options was addressed only recently. The paper [6] discusses an endogenous
emission permit price dynamics within equilibrium setting and elaborates on valuation
of European option on emission allowances. The paper [18] and the dissertation [25]
deal with the the risk-neutral allowance price formation within EU ETS. Here, utilizing
equilibrium properties, the price evolution is treated in terms of marginal abatement
costs and optimal stochastic control. Also, the work [5] is devoted to option pricing
within EU ETS. The authors suppose that the drift of allowance spot prices is related to
a hidden variable which describes the overall market position in allowance contracts and
they make use of filtering techniques to derive option price formulas which reflect specific
allowance banking regulations, valid in the EU ETS. Finally, the recent work [4] presents
an approach where emission certificate futures are modeled in terms of deterministic time
change applied to a certain class of interval-valued diffusion processes.
The present work brings aspects of risk-aversion into the line of research followed in
[3, 18] and [2], which we briefly sketch now. Within a stochastic model of an emissions
market, a so-called central planer problem is introduced and discussed in [18]. Under
additional assumptions, the authors formulate this problem in terms of continuous-time
stochastic optimization. Furthermore, they provide economic arguments justifying why
optimal control solutions correspond to an equilibrium of the emissions market. Inter-
preting the allowance certificate price as the marginal abatement costs, particular explicit
solutions are discussed and yield a dynamic stochastic model for allowance price evolu-
tion. The work [2] starts from the opposite direction. In a discrete-time framework, the
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Radner equilibrium of an emissions market is introduced and constructed via a solution
of the central planer problem. The work [3] yields an extension: in a slightly different
setting, it is proved that any market equilibrium is reached by this methodology. Thus,
results from [2, 18] and [3] show that a quantitative analysis of emissions markets is
tractable in terms of stochastic control theory. However, this connection is valid only if
risk aversion is neglected, in other words, under the assumption that each agent possesses
a linear utility function. Losing sight of risk aversion comes at the costs of unrealistic re-
sults. Among other singularities, it turns out that the equilibrium allowance price follows
a martingale (with respect to objective measure!) with the consequence that allowance
trading can be arbitrary, only the final position must be adjusted accordingly.
This work resolves all of these problems. Starting from the no-arbitrage property which
is satisfied in an equilibrium of a market with risk-averse players, we show that the risk-
neutral allowance price dynamics exhibits the above feedback property, which we formal-
ize as a fixed point equation, discussing its solution. We show that for such a risk-averse
setting, our fixed point equation plays the same role as the central planer optimal control
problem for the non-risk-averse situation. Namely, it provides a methodology to describe
the market equilibrium in terms of aggregated quantities. However, this description is
valid only from the viewpoint of the so-called risk neutral dynamics, not being suitable
for discussing all interesting problems. Still, derivatives valuation is naturally addressed
in, and can be obtained in, this setting.
3. Mathematical model
Let (Ω,F ,P, (Ft)Tt=0) be a filtered probability space. Assume that F0 is deterministic
and agree that all processes considered in this work are adapted to (Ft)Tt=0. Write Et(·)
and Pt to denote, respectively, conditional expectation and conditional distribution with
respect to Ft. Consider a market with a finite number I of the agents confronted with
emission reduction.
Emission dynamics. For each agent i ∈ I, introduce the stochastic process (Eit)
T−1
t=0
with the interpretation that Eit describes the total pollution of the agent i which is
emitted within the time interval [t, t+ 1] in the case of the so-called ‘business-as-usual’
scenario (where no abatement measure is applied). Although each agent is considered as
a potential producer, purely financial institutions are also covered with this approach by
setting emissions to zero, that is, Eit = 0 for t= 0, . . . , T − 1.
Abatement. Consider the opportunity to reduce emissions. Each agent i can decide at
any time t= 0, . . . , T − 1 to reduce its emissions within [t, t+1] by ξit pollutant units. We
suppose that each abatement level is possible, ranging from no reduction to full reduction.
Hence, we assume that 0≤ ξit ≤E
i
t holds for all t= 0, . . . , T − 1.
Abatement costs. We assume that the cost of abatement is a random function of the
reduced volume. The randomness is due to uncertainty in prices (of fuel) and is observable
at the corresponding time. Thus, if the agent i decides at time t= 0, . . . , T−1 on reduction
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of their own emissions by x ∈ [0,∞[ units, then it causes costs Cit(x), where given

Cit : [0,∞[×Ω 7→R is B([0,∞[)⊗Ft-measurable
and for each ω ∈Ω, x 7→ Cit(x)(ω) is strictly
convex and continuous with C(0) = 0.
(3.1)
Since emission savings cannot exceed the business-as-usual emission, the abatement ac-
tivity (ξit)
T−1
t=0 is feasible if
0≤ ξit ≤E
i
t , t= 0, . . . , T − 1. (3.2)
Following abatement policy (ξit)
T−1
t=0 , the agent i accumulates at the compliance date T
the total terminal costs
T−1∑
t=0
Cit(ξ
i
t). (3.3)
Abatement volume. For later use, let us introduce, for each ω ∈Ω, t= 0, . . . , T − 1 and
a ∈ [0,∞[, the abatement volume cit(a)(ω) as
cit(a)(ω) := argmin{C
i
t(x)(ω)− ax :x ∈ [0,E
i
t(ω)]}, (3.4)
which is well defined since, under the assumptions (3.1), the minimum of the function
x 7→ Cit(x)(ω)− ax on [0,E
i
t(ω)] is attained at the unique point. The reader may imagine
cit(a)(ω) as the total reduction volume which is available within [t, t+1] in the situation
ω at a price which is less than or equal to a (measured in currency unit per pollutant
unit). A straightforward proof shows that (3.1) ensures that
[0,∞[ 7→R, a 7→ cit(a)(ω) is non-decreasing and (3.5)
continuous for almost every ω ∈Ω and t= 0, . . . , T − 1.
For later use, we introduce the cumulative abatement volume function
ct(a) :=
∑
i∈I
cit(a), a ∈ [0,∞[. (3.6)
Obviously, ct(a)(ω) stands for the total abatement in the market, which is available from
all measures in the situation ω whose price is less than or equal to a ∈ [0,∞[.
Allowance trading. Suppose that, at any time t = 0, . . . , T , credits can be exchanged
between agents by trading at the spot price At. Denote by ϑ
i
t the change at time t
in allowance number held by agent i. That is, given the allowance prices (At)
T
t=0, the
position changes (ϑit)
T
t=0 yield costs
T∑
t=0
ϑitAt. (3.7)
1244 J. Hinz and A. Novikov
Penalty payment. The total pollution of the agent i can be expressed as a difference
T−1∑
t=0
Eit −
T−1∑
t=0
ξit
of the cumulative business-as-usual emission less the entire reduction. As mentioned
above, a penalty pi ∈]0,∞[ is being paid at maturity T for each unit of pollutant, which
is not covered by allowances. Considering the total change in the allowance position∑T
t=0 ϑ
i
t effected by trading, the loss of the agent i resulting from potential penalty
payment is
pi
(
T−1∑
t=0
(Eit − ξ
i
t − ϑ
i
t)− γ
i − ϑiT
)+
, (3.8)
where
γi, i ∈ I are agents’ initial allowance allocations. (3.9)
Remark 1. Our stylized scheme deals with stand-alone emission trading mechanisms.
In the real world, cap-and-trade systems operate on multi-period scales, where unused
allowances can be carried out (banked) into next period. Further period interconnec-
tions may include a transfer of future allocation from the next into the present period
(borrowing) and, in the case of non-compliance, a withdrawal of an appropriate number
of credits from the next period allocation in addition to penalty payment. To complete
the complexity, let us mention that different emissions markets could be interconnected
by acceptance of foreign certificates in the national scheme. Emission trading in multi-
period settings is addressed in, among others, [4] and [5]. Mathematically, it reduces to
the specification of a more complex penalty mechanism than that presented above. For
this reason, we have decided to focus on the stand-alone allowance market to analyze
quantitative methods in the simplest situation before tackling multi-scale systems (such
as the second period of EU ETS).
Recording uncertainty. In what follows, we also need to take into account uncertainty in
the emission recording. It is convenient to subtract these recording errors from the initial
allocation. Hence, we interpret γi as the credits allocated to the agent i less emissions
which become known with certainty only at time T . With this interpretation, γi stands
for allowances effectively available for compliance and is modeled by an FT -measurable
random variable. For later use, let us agree that the distribution of
∑
i∈I γ
i, conditioned
on FT−1, possesses almost surely no point masses, which implies that
P
(∑
i∈I
γi =X
)
= 0 for each FT−1-measurable X . (3.10)
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Admissible policies. Since maximally possible reduction cannot exceed emission, we
have (3.2). Let us define the space of feasible trading ϑi = (ϑit)
T
t=0 and abatement strate-
gies ξi = (ξit)
T−1
t=0 of the agent i∈ I by
U i := {(ϑi, ξi) : 0≤ ξit ≤E
i
t , t= 0, . . . , T − 1}. (3.11)
Individual wealth. In view of (3.3), (3.7) and (3.8), the revenue of the agent i following
admissible policy (ϑi, ξi) ∈ U i equals
LA,i(ϑi, ξi) = −
T−1∑
t=0
(ϑitAt +C
i(ξit))
(3.12)
− ϑiTAT − pi
(
T−1∑
t=0
(Eit − ξ
i
t − ϑ
i
t)− γ
i − ϑiT
)+
.
Risk aversion. To face risk preferences, suppose that attitudes of the agents i ∈ I
are described by utility functions U i :R 7→ R, which are continuous, strictly increasing
and concave. Consider the utility functional ui(X) = E(U i(X)), which is assumed to
be defined for each random variable X where the expectation is finite or +∞. Given
allowance price process A= (At)
T
t=0, the agent i behaves rationally, maximizing (ϑ
i, ξi) 7→
ui(LA,i(ϑi, ξi)) by an appropriate choice of their own policy (ϑi∗, ξi∗).
Market equilibrium. Following standard theory, a realistic market state is described by
the so-called equilibrium – a situation where the allowance price, positions and abatement
measures are such that each agent is satisfied by their own policy and, at the same time,
natural restrictions are fulfilled. In our framework, an appropriate notion of equilibrium
is given as follows.
Definition 1. The process A∗ = (A∗t )
T
t=0 is called an equilibrium allowance price process
if, for each i ∈ I, there exists (ϑ∗i, ξ∗i) ∈ U i such that ui(LA
∗,i(ϑ∗i, ξ∗i)) is finite and
(i) the cumulative changes in positions are in zero net supply, that is,∑
i∈I
ϑ∗it = 0 for all t= 0, . . . , T ; (3.13)
(ii) each agent i ∈ I is satisfied by their own policy, in the sense that
ui(LA
∗,i(ϑ∗i, ξ∗i))≥ ui(LA
∗,i(ϑi, ξi))
(3.14)
for each (ϑi, ξi) ∈ U i where ui(LA
∗,i(ϑi, ξi)) exists.
The existence of emissions market equilibrium is addressed in [2] and [3], under the
assumption of a linear utility function and in a slightly different setting. However, al-
though equilibrium modeling in the spirit of these contributions is appropriate to inves-
tigate important questions of optimal market design, it has little to offer to the problem
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of derivatives valuation. With the present approach, we intend to establish a reduced-
form model which describes the evolution of emission-related assets from a risk-neutral
perspective. We obtain a realistic picture by incorporating three essential assumptions
into a risk-neutral model. These assumptions are shown to be direct consequences of an
equilibrium situation:
(a) There is no arbitrage since, in equilibrium, any profitable strategy would imme-
diately be followed by all agents. This would instantaneously change prices and
exhaust any arbitrage opportunity.
(b) The allowance trading instantaneously triggers all abatement measures whose costs
are below allowance price. The explanation here is that if an agent possess a
technology with lower reduction costs than the present allowance price, then it is
optimal for that agent to immediately reduce pollution and take profit from selling
allowances.
(c) There are only two final outcomes for allowance price. Either the terminal al-
lowance price drops to zero or it approaches the penalty level. The reason is that
at maturity, the price must vanish if there is an excess in allowances, whereas in
the case of their shortage, the price will rise, reaching penalty. We believe that
in reality, an exact coincidence of allowance demand and supply occurs with zero
probability and can be neglected.
Let us formalize the above assertions (a), (b) and (c).
Proposition 1. Suppose that (A∗t )
T
t=0 is an equilibrium allowance price and (ξ
i∗
t )
T−1
t=0
for i ∈ I are the corresponding equilibrium abatement policies.
(a) There exists a measure Q which is equivalent to P such that (A∗t )
T
t=0 follows a
Q-martingale.
(b) For each i ∈ I, we have
ξi∗t = c
i
t(A
∗
t ), t= 0, . . . , T − 1, (3.15)
with abatement volume functions cit, t= 0, . . . , T − 1, from (3.4).
(c) The terminal value of the allowance price is given by
A∗T = pi1{
∑
i∈I
(
∑
T−1
t=0
(Ei
t
−ξi∗
t
)−γi)≥0}. (3.16)
Before we proceed with the proof, let us emphasize that this result can serve as a
starting point for risk-neutral modeling. The above proposition states that at equilibrium,
the allowance price process (A∗t )
T
t=0 follows a martingale with respect to an equivalent
measure Q∼ P whose terminal value is
A∗T = pi1{
∑
i∈I
∑
T
t=0
(Ei
t
−ξ∗
t
)−γi)≥0},
obviously depending on intermediate values (A∗t )
T−1
t=0 through abatement volume function
ξi∗t = c
i
t(A
∗
t ) for t= 0, . . . , T−1, i∈ I. The surprising and far-reaching consequence is that,
On fair pricing of emission-related derivatives 1247
from a risk-neutral perspective, only cumulative market quantities are relevant. To see
this, define the overall allowance shortage
ET =
∑
i∈I
(
T−1∑
t=0
Eit − γ
i
)
(3.17)
which would appear in the market without any emission penalty. Further, recall from
(3.4) and (3.6) the cumulative abatement functions to express the risk-neutral certificate
price dynamics in terms of the following feedback equation:
At = E
Q
t (pi1{ET−
∑
T−1
t=0
ct(A∗t )≥0}
), t= 0, . . . , T − 1.
Although individual market attributes and actions of the different agents seem to be
irrelevant in this picture, the reader should notice that this picture appears only from
the risk-neutral viewpoint. In line with standard aggregation theorems, the equilibrium
market state heavily depends on, and is determined by, market architecture, rules, risk
attitudes and uncertainty. However, once equilibrium is reached and all arbitrage op-
portunities are exhausted, asset dynamics can be considered under risk-neutral measure.
With respect to this measure, market evolution appears as if it were driven by cumulative
quantities only.
With this in mind, let us formulate the problem of the reduced-form modeling as
follows: 

Given measure Q∼ P, random variable ET
and abatement volume functions (ct)
T−1
t=0 ,
determine a Q-martingale (A∗t )
T
t=0 with
A∗T = pi1{ET−
∑
T−1
t=0
ct(A∗t )≥0}
.
(3.18)
Note that this formulation serves as a guideline for martingale modeling since price-
dependent abatement volume ct(a) can be estimated from market data, whereas potential
allowance shortage ET can be modeled in terms of total allowance allocation and demand
fluctuations on goods whose production causes the pollution. Finally, we shall emphasize
a natural passage to continuous time.


Given, on a probability space (Ω,F , P, (Ft)t∈[0,T ]),
an equivalent measure Q∼ P, random variable ET
and a family of abatement functions (ct)t∈[0,T ],
determine a Q-martingale (A∗t )t∈[0,T ] with
A∗T = pi1{ET−
∫
T
0
ct(A∗t )dt≥0}
.
(3.19)
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) According to the first fundamental theorem of asset pricing
(see [10]), it suffices to verify that if (A∗t )
T
t=0 is an equilibrium allowance price process,
then there is no arbitrage for allowance trading. Let us follow an indirect proof, supposing
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that (νt)
T−1
t=0 is an allowance trading arbitrage, meaning that
P
(
T−1∑
t=0
νt(At+1 −At)≥ 0
)
= 1, P
(
T−1∑
t=0
νt(At+1 −At)> 0
)
> 0. (3.20)
Now, we verify that in the presence of arbitrage, no equilibrium can exist since each
agent i can change their own policy (ϑ∗i, ξ∗i) to an improved strategy (ϑ˜i, ξ∗i) satisfying
ui(LA
∗,i(ϑ∗i, ξ∗i))< ui(LA
∗,i(ϑ˜i, ξ∗i)). (3.21)
The improvement is achieved by incorporating arbitrage (νt)
T−1
t=0 into their own allowance
trading as follows:
ϑ˜it := ϑ
∗i
t + (ν
i
t − ν
i
t−1) for all t= 0, . . . , T ,
with appropriate definitions ν−1 = νT := 0. Indeed, the revenue improvement from al-
lowance trading is
−
T∑
t=0
ϑ˜itAt =−
T∑
t=0
ϑ∗it At +
T−1∑
t=0
νit(At+1 −At),
which we combine with (3.20) to see that there is no optimality since
P(LA,i(ϑ∗i, ξi)≤ LA,i(ϑ˜i, ξi)) = 1, P(LA,i(ϑ∗i, ξi)<LA,i(ϑ˜i, ξi))> 0
together imply that
ui(LA,i(ϑ∗i, ξi))< ui(LA,i(ϑ˜i, ξi)).
(b) To prove (3.15), consider the bijection
U i→U i, (θi, ξi) 7→ (φ(θi, ξi), ξi), (3.22)
where the transformed trading strategy ϑi = φ(θi, ξi) is given by
ϑit = θ
i
t − ξ
i
t , t= 1, . . . , T − 1, ϑ
i
T = θ
i
T .
Obviously, (ϑi∗, ξi∗) is a maximizer to the original problem
U i→R, (ϑi, ξi) 7→ ui(LA
∗,i(ϑi, ξi))
if and only if (ϑi∗, ξi∗) = (φ(θi∗, ξi∗), ξi∗), where (θi∗, ξi∗) is a maximizer to the trans-
formed problem
U i→R, (θi, ξi) 7→ ui(LA
∗,i(φ(θi, ξi), ξi)). (3.23)
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The last line in the calculation
LA
∗,i(φ(θi, ξi), ξi)
=−
T−1∑
t=0
(θit − ξ
i
t)A
∗
t −
T−1∑
t=0
Cit(ξ
i
t)− pi
(
T−1∑
t=0
(Eit − ξ
i
t − (θ
i
t − ξ
i
t))− γ
i − θiT
)+
=−
T−1∑
t=0
θitA
∗
t − pi
(
T−1∑
t=0
(Eit − θ
i
t)− γ
i − θiT
)+
−
T−1∑
t=0
(Ci(ξit)−A
∗
t ξ
i
t) (3.24)
shows that if (θi∗, ξi∗) is a maximizer to (3.23), then ξ∗ must satisfy ξi∗t := c
i
t(A
∗
t ) for
t= 0, . . . , T − 1, which proves (3.15).
(c) This assertion is proved by an argument identical to that given in [2]. 
4. Reduced-form modeling
In what follows, we propose a solution to the problem of risk-neutral allowance price
modeling (3.18). Below, we prove that under the assumptions given above ((3.10), in
particular, is essential), the problem (3.18) possess a solution. Moreover, we show how
to obtain the martingale (A∗t )
T
t=0.
It turns out that the martingale closed by ET plays a crucial role, so we introduce
Et = E
Q(ET |Ft), t= 0, . . . , T.
For later use, let us also define its increments as
εt = Et − Et−1, t= 1, . . . , T.
Following the intuition that the equilibrium allowance price should be uniquely deter-
mined by the present time and the general market situation, we express a candidate for
allowance price as
A∗t (ω) = αt(Gt(ω))(ω), ω ∈Ω, t= 0, . . . , T, (4.1)
with hypothetic functionals
αt :R×Ω→ [0, pi], B(R)⊗Ft-measurable for t= 0, . . .T, (4.2)
applied to
Gt = Et −
t−1∑
s=0
cs(A
∗
s), t= 0, . . . , T. (4.3)
According to (3.18), this approach yields an obvious definition for αT :
αT (g)(ω) = pi1[0,∞[(g), ω ∈Ω, g ∈R. (4.4)
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Note that, given functionals (4.2), the price process (A∗t )
T
t=0 is indeed well defined by
recursive application of (4.3) and (4.1):
A∗t (ω) := αt(Gt(ω))(ω), (4.5)
Gt+1(ω) :=Gt(ω)− ct(A
∗
t (ω))(ω) + εt+1(ω), (4.6)
started at G0 := E0. (4.7)
Generated by this recursion, the process (A∗t )
T
t=0 follows a martingale if, for all t =
0, . . .T − 1 and almost all ω ∈Ω, the following holds:
αt(g)(ω) = E
Q
t (αt+1(g − ct(αt(g)(ω))(ω) + εt+1))(ω) for all g ∈R, ω ∈Ω.
Indeed, we have
E
Q
t (A
∗
t+1)(ω) = E
Q
t (αt+1(Gt+1))(ω)
=
∫
Ω
αt+1(Gt(ω
′)− ct(A
∗
t (ω
′))(ω′) + εt+1(ω
′))(ω′)Qt(dω
′)(ω)
=
∫
Ω
αt+1(Gt(ω)− ct(A
∗
t (ω))(ω) + εt+1(ω
′))(ω′)Qt(dω
′)(ω)
= EQt (αt+1(Gt(ω)− ct(αt(Gt(ω))(ω))(ω) + εt+1))(ω)
= αt(Gt(ω))(ω) =A
∗
t (ω).
In other words, it is sufficient to ensure that
for each g ∈R, αt(g)(ω) solves
a= EQt (αt+1(g− c(a) + εt+1))(ω) (4.8)
for almost all ω ∈Ω.
In the remainder of this section, we will show that the functionals (4.2) are recursively
obtained as the unique solution to (4.8), starting with αT from (4.4). First, let us prepare
an auxiliary result dealing with the solution to (4.8) where no conditional information
needs to be considered.
Lemma 1. Given
c :R→ R, non-decreasing, continuous, (4.9)
α1 :R×Ω→ [0, pi], B(R)⊗F-measurable, (4.10)
g 7→ α1(g)(ω), non-decreasing for almost all ω ∈Ω, (4.11)
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suppose that the random variable ε satisfies
R→ [0, pi], x 7→ EQ(α1(x+ ε)) =
∫
Ω
α1(x+ ε(ω
′))(ω′)Q(dω′)
(4.12)
is continuous.
For each g ∈R, introduce the function fg : [0, pi]→R given by
fg(a) := a−EQ(α1(g − c(a) + ε))
(4.13)
= a−
∫
Ω
α1(g − c(a) + ε(ω
′))(ω′)Q(dω′), a ∈ [0, pi].
The following assertions then hold:
(i) for each g ∈R, there exists a unique α0(g) ∈ [0, pi] with fg(α0(g)) = 0;
(ii) the root α0(g) of f
g is obtained as a limit α0(g) = limn→∞ a
g
n in the standard
bisection method
agn =
1
2 (a
g
n + a
g
n),
agn+1 = a
g
n, a
g
n+1 := a
g
n, if f
g(agn)≥ 0,
agn+1 = a
g
n, a
g
n+1 := a
g
n, if f
g(agn)< 0,
(4.14)
started at ag0 := 0, a
g
0 := pi;
(iii) the mapping R→ [0, pi], g 7→ α0(g) is non-decreasing and continuous.
Proof. (i) For each g ∈R+, the function fg is continuous due to (4.12) and the continuity
(4.9) of c. Thus, the existence of a root follows from the intermediate value theorem
because of
fg(0)≤ 0, fg(pi)≥ 0. (4.15)
The uniqueness of the root is ensured by the strict monotonic increase of fg. To verify
this, observe that (4.11) and (4.9) imply that the subtrahend
a 7→
∫
Ω
α1(g − c(a) + ε(ω
′))(ω′)Q(dω′)
in (4.13) is non-increasing, whereas the minuend a 7→ a is strictly increasing in a.
(ii) The bisection algorithm is properly initialized because of (4.15). Standard argu-
ments ensure its convergence to the root.
(iii) To show the monotonic increase of g 7→ α0(g), suppose that g′ < g. Then (4.11)
ensures that for each a ∈ [0, pi],∫
Ω
α1(g
′ − c(a) + ε(ω′))(ω′)Q(dω′)≤
∫
Ω
α1(g − c(a) + ε(ω
′))(ω′)Q(dω′),
giving fg
′
(a)≥ fg(a) for all a ∈ [0, pi], which implies that α0(g′)≤ α0(g).
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Now, let us turn to the continuity. If α0(g) ∈ [0, pi[, then there exists δ > 0 with α0(g)+δ ≤
pi. Due to the strict monotonic increase of fg, we obtain 0< fg(α0(g) + δ). If (gn)n∈N ⊂
R+ is a sequence with limn→∞ gn = g, then according to (4.12),
lim
n→∞
fgn(α0(g) + δ) = f
g(α0(g) + δ)> 0. (4.16)
Hence, there exists N ∈ N such that fgn(α0(g) + δ) > 0 holds for all n ≥ N . Thus, we
obtain
α0(g) ∈ [0, pi[ =⇒ lim sup
n→∞
α0(gn)≤ α0(g) + δ, if α0(g) + δ ≤ pi. (4.17)
Since δ > 0 is arbitrarily small and 0≤ α0(g)≤ pi, due to (i), this implication shows that
α0(·) is continuous on each point g with α0(g) = 0. A similar argument yields
α0(g) ∈]0, pi] =⇒ lim inf
n→∞
α0(gn)≥ α0(g)− δ, if α0(g)− δ ≥ 0. (4.18)
Again, since δ > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain the continuity of α0(·) on each point g with
α0(g) = pi. If α0(g) ∈]0, pi[, then the continuity of α0(·) on g follows by the combination
of (4.17) and (4.18). 
Let us now turn to the conditioned version of Lemma 1. Supposing the existence of
the regular Ft-conditioned distribution Qt, the proof reproduces the arguments of the
previous lemma with appropriate notational changes due to conditioning on the event
ω ∈ Ω. However, a useful insight is that the approximating points agn, n= 0,1,2, . . . , of
the bisection algorithm turn out to be dependent on g ∈ R and ω ∈ Ω in a B(R)⊗Ft-
measurable way, which shows that the functional under discussion, (g,ω) 7→ αt(g)(ω), is
also B(R)⊗Ft-measurable, being the limit of the sequence ((g,ω) 7→ ag,ωn )
∞
n=0 of measur-
able functions.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
c :R×Ω→R, B(R)⊗F-measurable such that (4.19)
a 7→ ct(a)(ω) is non-decreasing, continuous, (4.20)
αt+1 :R×Ω→ [0, pi], B(R)⊗F-measurable such that (4.21)
g 7→ αt+1(g)(ω) is non-decreasing for all ω ∈Ω. (4.22)
Given a regular version Qt of the Ft-conditioned distribution Q, assume that the random
variable εt+1 satisfies
R→ [0, pi], x 7→
∫
Ω
αt+1(x+ εt+1(ω
′))(ω′)Qt(dω
′)(ω)
(4.23)
is continuous for each ω ∈Ω.
The following assertions then hold:
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(i) there exists a unique B(R)⊗Ft-measurable [0, pi]-valued αt satisfying
αt(g)(ω) = E
Q
t (αt+1(g− ct(αt(g)) + εt+1))(ω)
(4.24)
for all g ∈R, for almost all ω ∈Ω;
(ii) the mapping R→ [0, pi], g 7→ αt(g)(ω) is non-decreasing and continuous for all
ω ∈Ω.
Proof. (i) As in the proof of the Lemma 1, we obtain the unique root αt(g)(ω) of the
function
fg,ω(a) := a−
∫
Ω
αt+1(g − ct(a)(ω) + εt+1(ω
′))(ω′)Qt(dω
′)(ω), a ∈ [0, pi].
By the bisection method,
ag,ωn =
1
2 (a
g,ω
n + a
g,ω
n ),
ag,ωn+1 = a
gω
n , a
g,ω
n+1 := a
g,ω
n , if f
g,ω(ag,ωn )≥ 0,
agn+1 = a
g,ω
n , a
g,ω
n+1 := a
g
n, if f
g,ω(ag,ωn )< 0,
started at ag,ω0 := 0, a
g,ω
0 := pi. Since
(g,ω, a) 7→ fg,ω(a) is B(R)⊗Ft ⊗B([0, pi])-measurable,
each bisection point (g,ω) 7→ ag,ωn is B(R)⊗ Ft-measurable, which shows that for n→
∞, the pointwise limit (g,ω) 7→ αt(g,ω) of the bisection sequence is also B(R) ⊗ Ft-
measurable. By construction, the equality
αt(g)(ω) =
∫
Ω
αt+1(g − ct(αt(g)(ω))(ω) + εt+1(ω
′))(ω′)Qt(dω
′)(ω)
holds for all g ∈ R and ω ∈ Ω, whose right-hand side is nothing but the right-hand side
of (4.24) for each g ∈R.
(ii) The proof is obtained from (iii) of the previous lemma by replacing α1(·), α0(·),
c(·) and Q(dω′) by αt+1(·)(ω),αt(·)(ω), ct(·)(ω) and Qt(dω′)(ω), respectively, with ap-
propriate notational adaptations according to the conditioning on ω. 
Finally, we address a solution to (3.18) in the last point of the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider ET under the model assumption (3.10) and the cumulative
abatement volume functions from (3.6) under (3.1) and (3.4).
(i) Given measure Q∼ P , there exist functionals
αt :R×Ω→ [0, pi], B(R)⊗Ft-measurable for t= 0, . . .T, (4.25)
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which fulfill, for all g ∈R,
αT (g) = pi1[0,∞[(g), (4.26)
αt(g) = E
Q
t (αt+1(g − ct(αt(g)) + εt+1)), t= 0, . . . , T − 1. (4.27)
(ii) There exists a Q-martingale (A∗t )
T
t=0 which satisfies
A∗T = pi1{ET−
∑
T−1
t=0
ct(A∗t )≥0}
. (4.28)
Proof. (i) In this proof, we repeatedly make use of Lemma 2. Let us start with t= T − 1
and verify that the assumptions of this lemma are satisfied. Due to continuity (3.6) of the
abatement function, we have (4.9). The properties (4.21) and (4.22) hold for t= T − 1,
by definition (4.26). To show (4.24), we utilize the specific form of αT :
x 7→
∫
Ω
αT (x+ εT (ω
′))(ω′)QT−1(dω
′)(ω) = QT−1(x+ εT ≥ 0)(ω). (4.29)
Note that, due to (3.10), there are almost surely no point masses in the distribution of
εT =
∑
i∈I
γi −EQT−1
(∑
i∈I
γi
)
conditioned on FT−1 (with respect Q, since Q∼ P ). That is, (4.29) is continuous for each
ω ∈Ω, as required in (4.24). Hence, (i) of Lemma 2 yields the functional αT−1 satisfying
(4.27) (with t= T − 1), as required. To proceed by induction, we emphasize that (ii) of
Lemma 2 ensures that g 7→ αT−1(g)(ω) is non-decreasing and continuous for all ω ∈ Ω.
That is, for the next step, t = T − 2, the assumption (4.22) on αT−1 is automatically
satisfied. Moreover, (4.24) now follows, due to the continuity of g 7→ αT−1(g)(ω), from
the pointwise convergence
lim
n→∞
αT−1(xn + εT−1(ω
′))(ω′) = αT−1(x+ εT−1(ω
′))(ω′) for all ω′ ∈Ω,
dominated by pi, which holds for each (xn)n∈N ⊂ R with limn→∞ xn = x. That is, all
assumptions of Lemma 2 are also fulfilled for t= T − 2. Proceeding recursively for t=
T − 2, . . . ,0, we obtain (αt)Tt=0 with (4.25), (4.26) and (4.27).
(ii) As suggested by (4.5)–(4.7), we define, for all ω ∈Ω,
A∗t (ω) := αt(Gt(ω))(ω),
Gt+1(ω) :=Gt(ω)− ct(A
∗
t (ω))(ω) + εt+1(ω),
started at G0 := E0.
The process (A∗t )
T
t=0 generated in this way obeys the terminal condition (4.28), in view of
(4.26). To show the Q-martingale property of (A∗t )
T
t=0, we calculate, for t= 0, . . . , T − 1,
E
Q
t (A
∗
t+1)(ω) = E
Q
t (αt+1(Gt+1))(ω)
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= EQt (αt+1(Gt(ω)− ct(A
∗
t (ω))(ω) + εt+1))(ω)
= EQt (αt+1(Gt(ω)− ct(αt(Gt(ω))(ω))(ω) + εt+1))(ω)
= αt(Gt+1(ω))(ω) =A
∗
t (ω)
for almost all ω ∈Ω, where the penultimate equality follows from (4.27). 
5. Applications
Let us elaborate on the computational feasibility of our reduced-form modeling. For
illustrative purposes, we focus on the simplest case of martingales with independent
increments and deterministic abatement functions. We assume that:
εt+1 and Ft are independent under Q for all t= 0, . . . , T − 1; (5.1)
ct : [0,∞[→R is deterministic and time constant (ct = c)
T−1
t=0 . (5.2)
Under these assumptions, the randomness enters the allowance price through the present
up-to-day emissions only. More precisely, (5.1) ensures that
ω 7→ αt(g)(ω) = αt(g) is constant on Ω. (5.3)
Let us verify this assertion. For t= T , (5.3) holds, by definition (4.26). For t= T −1, . . . ,1,
we proceed inductively as follows: by construction, αt(g)(ω) is the unique solution a to
a =
∫
Ω
αt+1(g − ct(a) + εt+1(ω
′))(ω′)Qt(dω
′)(ω)
=
∫
Ω
αt+1(g − ct(a) + εt+1(ω
′))Q(dω′), (5.4)
where, in the last equality, we have utilized the fact that Qt =Q, due to the independence
(5.1), and the fact that αt+1(g) does not depend on ω, by the the induction assumption.
Obviously, the fixed point αt(g)(ω) := a from (5.4) also does not depend on ω.
For numerical calculation, we rely on the one-dimensional least-squares Monte Carlo
method, which is applicable in our case of martingales with independent increments.
Although this setting is relatively restrictive, it covers a sufficiently rich class of mar-
tingales. For instance, important cases of information shocks leading to allowance price
jumps can be easily addressed under this approach when (Et)Tt=0 is modeled as an ap-
propriately sampled, centered Poisson process. In this case, fixed point equations can be
treated analytically. We do not follow this path in favor of numerical methods, which
deserve particular attention due to the complexity of emissions markets. In particular,
extensions of Monte Carlo methods to the multidimensional setting (see [20]) seem to
be appropriate. A preliminary analysis shows that assuming the existence of a global
Markovian state process allows independence to be weakened to conditional indepen-
dence, which leads to multidimensional Monte Carlo, in the sense of [20], since the state
process gives additional dimensions.
1256 J. Hinz and A. Novikov
We now focus on computational aspects. From (5.3), it follows that αt(Gt) is a σ(Gt)-
measurable random variable. Thus, in the equality (4.27), the condition Ft can be re-
placed by the condition σ(Gt):
αt(Gt) = E
Q(αt+1(Gt − ct(αt(Gt)) + εt+1)|σ(Gt)). (5.5)
We shall treat this relation as a fixed point equation for the Borel-measurable function
αt and attempt to obtain a solution in the limit αt = limn→∞α
n
t of iterations
αn+1t (Gt) = E
Q(αt+1(Gt − ct(α
n
t (Gt)) + εt+1)|σ(Gt)), n ∈N, (5.6)
started at α0t = αt+1. (Note that, given αt+1 and α
n
t , the equation (5.6) indeed defines
a Borel function αn+1t by the factorization of the σ(Gt)-measurable random variable on
the right-hand side of (5.6).) For numerical calculation of conditional expectations, we
suggest using the least-squares Monte Carlo method.
To explain the principle of the least-squares Monte Carlo approach (see [12] and [20])
in more detail, we abstract from the concrete situation (5.6) and consider
ϕ(G) = EQ(φ(G,ε)|σ(G)),
where ε,G are R-valued and independent with respect to Q and φ is a bounded
Borel function on R2. Under these assumptions, the function ϕ is obtained as ϕ(g) =∫
R
φ(g, e)Qε(de) for QG-almost all g ∈ R, where Qε,QG are image measures of Q under
ε and G, respectively. An equivalent condition defining ϕ is the orthogonality
determine ϕ ∈L2(R, µ) such that for all ψ ∈Ψ,
(5.7)∫
R2
(ϕ(g)− φ(g, e))ψ(g)(Qε ⊗ µ)(de,dg) = 0,
where µ is a measure which is equivalent to QG and Ψ stands for a set of functions which
are square-integrable with respect to µ, whose linear space is dense in L2(R, µ). The idea
of the least-squares Monte Carlo method is to relax, for computational tractability, the
principle (5.7) to
determine ϕ ∈ linΨ such that for all ψ ∈Ψ,
(5.8)
K∑
k=1
(ϕ(gk)− φ(gk, ek))ψ(gk) = 0,
with a finite set of basis functions
Ψ = {ψj : j = 1, . . . , J}
and an appropriate sample
S := (ek, gk)
K
k=1 ⊂R
2,
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chosen such that the combination 1
K
∑K
k=1 δ(ek,gk) of the Dirac measures approximates
the distribution Qε⊗µ (for instance, S being realizations of K ∈N independent Qε⊗µ-
distributed random variables). The solution to the weakened problem (5.8) is given in
terms of
realizations φ(S) = (φ(ek, gk))
K
k=1 of φ on the sample S,
(5.9)
realizations M = (ψj(gk))
K,J
k=1,j=1 of basis functions on S,
as follows:
if q = (qj)
J
j=1 fulfills M
⊤Mq =M⊤φ(S),
then (5.8) is solved by ϕ=
J∑
j=1
qjψj .
We now formulate an algorithm for the approximate calculation of (5.5) in which the
conditional expectation is replaced by the least-squares Monte Carlo projection. To ease
notation, let us suppose that (εt)
T
t=1 are identically distributed (in addition to their
independence (5.1)).
Allowance prices via Monte Carlo method.
1. Initialization. Given sample S = (ek, gk)
K
k=1 ⊂ R
2 describing the distribution of
Qε1 ⊗ µ and a set of basis functions Ψ = (ψi)Jj=1 on R, define M as in (5.9). Set
αT (g) = 1[0,∞[(g) for all g ∈R and proceed in the next step with t := T − 1.
Figure 1. The functions αt for t= T −1, . . . , T −6, from the least-squares Monte Carlo method.
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2. Iteration. Define α0t = αt and proceed in the next step with n := 0.
(2a) Calculate φn+1(S) := (αt+1(gk − ct(αnt (gk)) + ek))
K
k=1.
(2b) Determine a solution qn+1 ∈RJ to M⊤Mqn+1 =M⊤φn+1(S).
(2c) Define αn+1t :=
∑J
j=1 q
n+1
j ψj .
(2d) If maxKk=1 |α
n+1
t (gk)−α
n
t (gk)| ≥ ε, then put n := n+1 and continue with step
2a).
If maxKk=1 |α
n+1
t (gk)− α
n
t (gk)| < ε, then set t := t− 1. If t > 1, go to step 2,
otherwise finish.
Example. To illustrate allowance price calculation via the Monte Carlo method, we
consider the following numerical example. Suppose that the penalty is set at pi = 100 and
that the martingale increments (εt)
T
t=1 are independent, identically Normally distributed.
Note that by an appropriate choice of the emission measurement scale, the standard
deviation can always be normalized, thus we have assumed that each εt is N (0.5,1)-
distributed. Further, consider the basis consisting of piecewise linear hut functions
ψj :R→ [0,1], x 7→ (1− |zj − x|/h)
+ for x ∈R, j = 1, . . . , J,
where the peaks z1 =−(J − 1) ∗ h/2, . . . , zJ = (J − 1) ∗ h/2 are chosen to be equidistant
with the distance h > 0. For numerical illustration, we set J = 16 and h := 1. Further,
the sample S = (ek, gk)
K
k=1 for the Monte Carlo method is generated with K = 1000
outcomes. For (ek)
K
k=1, we followed a natural choice, taking realizations of K indepen-
dent N (0.5,1)-distributed random variables. However, since the distribution of Gt is not
known in advance, an appropriate candidate for µ seems to be the uniform distribution
concentrated on the interval which is relevant for calculations. That is, the outcomes
(gk)
K
k=1 are constructed by equidistant sampling of [z1, zJ ], ranging from g1 = z1 =−7.5
to gK = zJ = 7.5. For the cumulative volume function c :R→ R, a 7→ 0.1
√
(a)+, we ob-
served a fast and stable convergence which gave a reasonable outcome within a few
iterations. The resulting functions (αt)
T−6
t=T−1 are depicted in Figure 1.
Let us outline a valuation procedure for a European call on emission allowance price.
Valuation of European call via Monte Carlo method.
1. Given basis functions Ψ = (ψj)
J
j=1 and a sample S = (ek, gk)
K
k=1 ⊂ R
2 which ap-
proximates Qε1⊗µ, determine (αt)0t=T in terms of basis coefficients using the above
least-squares Monte Carlo algorithm.
2. Given maturity time τ ∈ {1, . . . , T } of the European call, determine its pay-off f ττ :=
(ατ−K)+. Calculate least-squares projections, recursively processing for u= τ, . . . , t
as follows:
(a) put φ(S) = (f τu (gk − cu(αu(gk)) + ek))
K
k=1;
(b) obtain q as solution to M⊤Mq =Mφ;
(c) set f τu−1 =
∑J
j=1 qjψj ;
(d) if u− 1 = t, then finish, otherwise set u := u− 1 and return to (a).
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3. Given recent allowance price a, calculate the state variable g as solution to a= αt(g).
4. Plug in the state variable g and into function f τ (t, ·) to obtain the price of the
European call as as f τ (t, g).
Let us conclude this section by sketching core ideas on continuous-time modeling. Our
analysis shows that the risk-neutral allowance price evolution (At)
T
t=0 must be described
by a martingale whose terminal value is digital and depends on the intermediate values
(see (3.19)). Suppose that the compliance period is given by an interval [0, T ], such that
all relevant random evolutions are described by adapted stochastic processes on
filtered probability space (Ω,F , P, (Ft)t∈[0,T ])
(5.10)
equipped with probability measure Q∼ P,
where Q represents the spot martingale measure. Given a random variable ET and ap-
propriate non-decreasing and continuous abatement functions ct :R+×Ω→R+ indexed
by t ∈ [0, T ], we follow an analogy to discrete time and consider solutions (At)t∈[0,T ] to
At = piE
Q(1{ET−
∫
T
0
ct(As)ds≥0}
|Ft), t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.11)
Our results from the discrete-time setting suggest that if

the increments of the martingale (Et =EQ(ET |Ft))t∈[0,T ] are
independent and the abatement functions ct :R+×→R+
are deterministic and time constant (ct = c)t∈[0,T ],
(5.12)
then a solution to (5.11) should be expected in the functional form
At = α(t,Gt), t ∈ [0, T ],
with an appropriate deterministic function
α : [0, T ]×R 7→R, (t, g) 7→ α(t, g), (5.13)
and a state process (Gt)t∈[0,T ] given by
Gt = Et −
∫ t
0
cs(As) ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
To illustrate how such an approach allows one to guess a solution, assume that
(Ω,F , P, (Ft)t∈[0,T ]) supports the process (Wt,Ft)t∈[0,T ]
(5.14)
of Brownian motion with respect to Q∼ P.
Furthermore, we respond to (5.12), supposing that
dEt = σt dWtwith pre-specified deterministic (σt)t∈[0,T ] and
continuous and non-decreasing abatement functions (ct = c)t∈[0,T ].
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To ensure the martingale property of (At = α(t,Gt))t∈[0,T ], apply the Itoˆ formula
dAt = dα(t,Gt) = ∂(1,0)α(t,Gt) dt+ ∂(0,1)α(t,Gt) dGt +
1
2∂(0,2)α(t,Gt) d[G]t
= ∂(1,0)α(t,Gt) dt− ∂(0,1)α(t,Gt)c(α(t,Gt)) dt+
1
2∂(0,2)α(t,Gt)σ
2
t dt
+ ∂(0,1)α(t,Gt)σt dWt
and claim the function α as a solution on [0, T [×R to
∂(1,0)α(t, g)− ∂(0,1)α(t, g)c(α(t, g)) +
1
2∂(0,2)α(t, g)σ
2
t = 0 (5.15)
with boundary condition
α(T, g) = pi1[0,∞[(g) for all g ∈R, (5.16)
justified by the digital terminal allowance price. Having obtained α in this way, we
construct the state process as the solution to the stochastic differential equation
dGt = dEt − c(α(t,Gt)) dt, G0 = E0, (5.17)
and then determine
At := α(t,Gt), t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.18)
Finally, this process must be verified in order to solve (5.11).
6. Conclusion
This article explains the logical principles underlying risk-neutral modeling of emission
certificate price evolution. We show that within a realistic situation of risk-averse market
players, there is no connection between social optimality and market equilibrium, but
there is a useful feedback relation characterizing risk-neutral allowance price dynamics.
Expressing this result in terms of fixed point equations on the level of martingales,
we address the existence of its solution and elaborate on its algorithmic tractability.
Furthermore, we suggest an extension of these concepts to continuous time and show that
promising results can be obtained using diffusion processes. Here, emission allowances
and their options can be described in terms of standard partial differential equations.
Although option pricing in this framework seems to be appealing, we believe that it is not
superior to our Monte Carlo method since the latter can be used in high dimensions and,
more importantly, in the presence of jumps in the martingale (Et)
T
t=0. This is particularly
important to describe price shocks, which may result from possible discontinuities in the
information flow.
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